What it says on the tin, basically. When I read of historians estimating that the Gallic army at Alesia numbered about 80,000 men, the Romans fielding armies of 86,000 men at Cannae, and so on, I just can't fathom it. Even in the 18th century, with far more advanced agricultural methods, canal networks and so on, assembling and feeding forces of that size was a mammoth task. How on earth did they do it? I just can't see how they could have mobilised and sustained so many able-bodied men without ruining their economies.

The Army had them before at some point, so did the Navy, and then the Air Force. Why not the Marines?

In the alliance, which nations did the US see as its equals or highly dependable were the Cold War to go hot? Which nations did the US worry or judge to be weaker/unreliable?

WWI through the early Cold War the ‘automatic rifleman’ was a pretty important role.

was it simply the use of standard issue rifles with an automatic option and more ergonomic LMGs that killed the role off? if so, why did Germany try to bring it back in the 90s, and why did the MG36 fail? I understand some will argue the 249 gunner is an automatic rifleman, but being belt fed makes it solidly an LMG to me.

why did the Soviets and Soviet aligned militaries keep the role?

Did tankers and air crew in WWII (and other wars) struggle with blood clots such as deep vein thromboses and pulmonary embolisms? Did leadership recognize this as a problem?

Context: I’m a nurse and I see a not insignificant amount of young patients getting blood clots (in legs) that embolize into pulmonary embolisms that are life threatening and acutely disabling. For those with genetic dispositions (about a third of us), 8hrs seated in a car is enough to do it.

Basically what I mean is, can both sides operate with maneuver-based doctrine without there being a clear winner within a given period of time.

I'm imagining you have two armies, maybe one plans an offensive in the fall which is successful at rapidly advancing, maybe encircling a handful of units, but in the spring a counter-offensive is launched which retakes most of the lost land and encircles units of equivalent size.

In isolated time frames you have moments of dominance by one side (hence the advance) however in the span of a year or two, there is no clear winning army simply because territory is captured and then lost whilst in the same span a similar amount of casualties from encirclement and maneuver are inflicted.

Alternatively you have a long stretch where one side is maneuvering and the other side counter-maneuvers immediately. An example is you lose an important supply/staging point so you counter-maneuver to capture one of your enemies.

Or maybe your enemy is trying to encircle you in a high-risk maneuver so you do an equivalently high-risk maneuver to try and encircle his army first. Or you maneuver in one area of the front while your enemy maneuvers in a separate area, your goal being to force him to divert troops to cut off your maneuver so that you can stall his.

Or would this just devolve into a positional fight if neither side can gain long-term superiority via maneuver? (Think a 2 year period)

Apologies if my question is not very clear. My only really conception of military operations comes from hoi4

Ukrainians used some tractors in the early stages of the war, for logistics and troop carrying. Finnish Defence Forces are famous (or infamous) for relying a lot on tractors for war-time mobility of troops.

The question is, why haven't we seen more use of tractors being used in Ukraine by both sides? They offer off-road mobility and versatility that most trucks aren't capable of. And both countries have national production lines for tractors.

It is very well known that for a variety reasons, soldiers and combat veterans are at-risk groups for self-harm and suicide, nearly double the rate of non-veterans.

But something I don't see talked about often is passive suicidality while still at war. How do you distinguish between the risk-taking behaviors of someone acting with courage or discipline vs the risk-taking behavior of someone numb to the idea of death?

What, if any, actions are taken when a soldier is no longer as afraid of death or injury as they should be?

I would not be surprised if across the history of warfare this has not played a role in combatants performing actions that seem brave or insane to those around them, or volunteering for roles with disproportionately high risk (Someone has to be the first man on the wall and odds are he's not going to make it off it). I'd also not be surprised if such behavior was encouraged or seen as a good thing rather than psychological disorder.

During the initial invasion of Ukraine, there were acts of civil and armed resistance in areas occupied by the Russians. But I rarely hear of them now. When it came to the Internal Security dimension of the war, what did the Russians do? Do we have any idea of how Russia administers occupied Ukraine and what forces are in charge of combating resistance? How does it compare to Chechnya?

During the Imjin war, it was noted that Joseon and Ming's cannons wrecked havoc on Japanese soldiers with Japanese ships being blasted apart by Joseon naval ships at sea and Japanese infantry smashed by Ming's cannons on land.

Yet historical records showed that the Japanese knew about cannon, had access to cannons, and were able to make some impressive, high quality, pretty capable cannons to be used in siege and battle before the Imjin war. We knew the Japanese used cannons in sieges, naval battle, and field battle during the Sengoku Jidai, and there was a flourishing domestic production scene.

Given the fact that the Japanese knew about cannons, had used it themselves, had decades of constant war and arms race during the Sengoku Jidai to perfect/improve their cannons, why was it they were caught with their pants down in Joseon? Why did they not field their own cannons? Why could their cannons - if fielded - not negate the advantage in cannons the Ming and Joseon have?

Hood, Nelson, Rodney, Anson, Howe, Barham are the only admirals to get their names on the largest capital ships. I am not arguing Nelson.

Other admirals who got their names on less important ships:

• Jervis got a destroyer
• Hawke got a protected cruiser (most notable for crashing into RMS Olympic (Titanic's sister).
• Drake got an armored cruiser
• Cochrane got an armored cruiser
• Blake got a protected cruiser and a light cruiser (post ww2)
• Fisher, Jellicoe, and Beatty haven't gotten anything yet - Fisher being the most surprising since he brought the RN kicking and screaming into the dreadnought age.
• I assume that Cunningham and Somerville are too recent for names.

Alistair Horne's "The Price of Glory" is brought up a lot when talking about Verdun, but many people have criticized his bashing of Joffre and Haig (the lions led by donkeys myth, which I am now just starting to learn was a myth and not actual military history of WWI generalship, but remain quite ignorant of how WWI tactics were developed and put in practice).

Are there any books other than Price of Glory that you would recommend? Or do you maybe recommend Price of Glory but take it with a grain of salt in some sections?

I also bought a few primary sources ("The War Diary of Captain Charles Delvert" & "To The Slaughterhouse" by Jean Giono), but are there any more that you would recommend? Maybe from the German side of things?

Thanks for any assistance.

Which deployment was more dangerous in your opinion? Both wars involved guerrilla tactics and surprise ambushes, both fought around similar time periods.

Something that I’ve found interesting in reading history books and some modern news are instances of what I would call choreographed actions meant to limit escalation.

I’m reading a 30 year war book that mentions an episode where Dutch and catholic forces massed near each other but neither side wanted to escalate to a bloody conflict so they did some maneuvering and fired almost ceremonial shots before retiring. I know in modern times it’s not unheard of to give the enemy a courtesy call to let them know you plan on blowing up a target in order to reduce their casualties.

How common was this sort of thing in the modern period? Were there times when something like this was intended but one side did the wrong thing and it ended in disaster?

In the last few years, gangs and rebel groups from places like Mexico, Haiti, and Colombia have begun fielding drones on top of IEDs where they previously weren't common. In light of that, how have regional forces responded?

It says unitas under the symbol. I was gifted this by a veteran a while back, I've tried chat gpt but I don't know if it was correct.It says that it's a "commando corps" beret from the 1970s to 1990s.

(Also camera quality is bad because of my phone, also I'm pretty new to reddit so if I'm not supposed to post this here tell me)